America
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Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Art
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Books
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Criticism
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Culture
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Humor and Satire
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Innovations
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Insight
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Internet
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Law
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Literature
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Moving Images
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
People
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Photography
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Poems
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Politics
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Quote Bank
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Science
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Space
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Style
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
Terror
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->
War
Think Links
Intelliseek's BlogPulse Newswire
FROM THE COMMENTS: "Samurai warriors had a philosophy, 'ken tai i-chi' or attack and defend are the same thing. It is the highest form of defense to cut down your enemy before he launches his attack. Many schools of swordsmanship, particularly Jigen Ryu, had no defensive techniques in their curriculum."
table test no line breaks
Table test no line breaks| NPR's Transcript | My comments |
| Steve Inskeep: As always, the news in Iraq may affect the campaign. In the last day, that news has included a U.S. offfensive in Falluja and a bombing in Baghdad. The bombers killed six people inside the Green Zone. That's a fortified area surrounded by concrete barriers and razor wire. It is where the Americans have run their operations since coming to Baghdad. Journalist William Langewiesche has spent time in the Green Zone as a reporter for the Atlantic Monthly. he says that from the start of the occupation, security concerns have isolated American decision makers from the country around them. | Yup, Mr. Inskeep, tell how you want your conclusion to affect the campaign right upfront, even if the logic of the piece isn't well thought out, of broad scope and with deep insight, or particularly useful to voters. |
| WL: It is a highly fortified area that is mostly park and monumental buildings. Saddam's various palaces are in there, too -- one of which now is the center of American operations. This is not a military base, it is a civilian base protected by the military, but it has many of those cultural oddities that being somewhere far away yet eating all American food and Americans talking primarily to Americans. | In other words, let me convey at the outset that I believe people who live here must be out of touch. Otherwise they'd be eating local fare. I also want to convey that Americans here who are trying to help don't come into contact with the Iraqis who, you will remember, are actually running Iraq now. |
| SI: How did concerns about security affect the attitudes of people inside the Green Zone? | As if you expected them to want something other than to be secure while they were here. Couldn't you have started off with a more focused question like, who do you suppose has put coalition members at risk? Why do ou suppose Zarqawi wants coalition members at risk? |
| WL: Well, the Green Zone has always been all about security. As the insurgency has grown in Iraq, those concerns have magnified, for good reason. And the Green Zone has become the fortress. | Damn right it's a good reason. But keep things in perspective. Baghdad may be the biggest city, but Iraq is a big country. You have to be careful not to let focus on the center of Iraq to draw attention from all the positive that is at work in Iraq. |
| SI: When you go back a year or so, did the Americans overreact to the security problems? | Where did you get these questions? |
| WL: No. I don't think they overreacted to it. I think that it was institutionally inevitable the United States will retreat into fortified compounds. I think the mistake that was made was not to realize that about our ourselves. We need to think about where we want those fortified compounds to be. And what they look like to the locals. To the Iraqis it has always looked like fear of them. Disdain of them. The other effect is that it simply isolated the Americans from Iraq. | Of course they didn't overreact. They did what was required to protect he lives of people that did not deserve to be blown up by suicide bombers or beheaded by those who don't want Iraq to become a free, democratic society. |
| SI: Did they then make up unrealistic plans for Iraq? | Are you implying that mistakes were made because people are obliged to protect themselves while trying to rescusitate Iraq? |
| WL: Yes. Of course. Totally. It's hard to know where even to begin. You can pretty much look at the entire product of the CPA -- the Coalition Provisional Authority -- and say that it was unrealistic. I can think of attempts to regulate the traffic. There was an attempt basically to impose a Maryland State Traffic Code on Baghdad. | Some of the plans undoubtedly were unrealistic, but remember that Iraq had been systematically throttled for decades. It had no infrastructure or resilient educated middle class to draw on. |
| SI: Would you say that these are mostly well-intentioned people? People who thought they could impose American systems on Iraq and it would just work? That was the idea? | I repeat, where did you get these questions? |
| WL: Of course. I think we have been blinded by success and power into thinking that we are rich and powerful because of our own attributes. Well, to some extent that may be true. But there is also an element of luck. Chance. History. | Of course they were well-intentioned. Remember, they were also temporary. The idea has always been to turn the government of the Iraqis over Iraqis. |
| SI: Could there have been a different last year and a half? If the Americans had simply said we're not going to hide in fortified compounds. We're going to move about the country to make sure we understand the country and accept that some American civilians as well as soldiers are going to geet killed? | Is chronic compression of timeline a disease amongst such hosts? They seem incapable of conceiving that you can't go back and relive the past. You have to do now what can be done now. |
| WL: I think at this stage it is much too late for that. If you say a year and a half, yes. I mean, don't forget, when the United States first came in, though we were not greated with flowers, as people apparently in the White House expected, we were not greeted with aggressive hostility. We were greeted with a question mark. There were other things going wrong. If we could have addressed those, sure, we would not be in the situation we are in now. Look, this is not just terrorism -- foreign terrorism -- sure, that is an element... something that we could not have controlled. Far more important, this is a wide-spread and very popular insurgency against the American presence. And it's the insurgency that matters now. | That is what is known as a stupid-ass question that brings to mind the British in the Revolutionary War lined up column by column to be mowed down by the colonists. What sensible government is going to put its citizens into harms way unless it is absolutely necessary. |
| SI: We've been talking to William Langewiesche... | Or, "I've been leading William Langewiesche on to say what I want him to say in a most useless and non-productive direction... |
Publications of Note
Online locations of Periodicals
Continue reading ->
Blogs of Note
A few links to keep in mind.
Continue reading ->
Aliens Cause Global Warming
A lecture by Michael Crichton -- January 17, 2003
Continue reading ->